Abstract-This paper presents a new counter-measure to mitigate denial-of-service cyber-attacks in linear time-invariant (LTI) systems. We first design a sparse linear quadratic regulator (LQR) optimal controller for a given LTI plant and evaluate the priority of the feedback communication links in terms of the loss of closed-loop performance when the corresponding block of the feedback gain matrix is removed. An attacker may know about this priority ordering, and thereby attack the links with the highest priority. To prevent this, we present a message rerouting strategy by which the states that are scheduled to be transmitted through the high priority links can be rerouted through lower priority ones in case the former get attacked. Since the attacked link is not available for service, and the states of the low priority links can no longer be accommodated either, we run a structured H 2 control algorithm to determine the post-attack optimal feedback gains. We illustrate various aspects of the proposed algorithms by simulations.
I. Introduction
Security of cyber-physical systems has drawn a significant research attention in recent times. Due to notable instances of cyberattacks such as WannaCry [1] , NotPetya [2] , and Ukranian blackout [3] , there have been increased interests to design countermeasures to mitigate attacks for cyber-physical systems. A significant part of the existing work focuses on centralized systems (see e.g., [4] , [5] ) while the recent results in [6] , [7] rely on distributed algorithms. Prompted by these considerations, this paper presents a novel sparse optimization based countermeasure to alleviate cyberattacks for a general class of LTI systems.
System theoretic approaches to tackle a class of cyber-attacks namely Denial of Service (DoS in short) have recently been investigated in [8, 9, 10] . Given a LTI system, [8] presents a novel analysis methodology to maintain the closed loop stability under DoS attacks, while [9] unveils a similar analysis for its nonlinear counterpart. Given a class of complex networks, [10] analyzes the consensus property of self-triggered agents in the presence of DoS attacks. The analysis documented in [10] introduces the notion of persistence-of-communication and characterizes DoS frequency and duration to attain consensus under DoS attacks.
Substantial studies have been undertaken on the analysis of consensus/ synchronization behavior under DoS attacks, see, for example [11, 12, 13] and the references therein. In the context of multi-agent systems, a group of agents is said to reach consensus/ synchronization when all individuals converge towards a common value (consensus) / state (synchronization). Consensus analysis over unreliable networks has been motivated by the seminal contribution from [11] , in which, the authors consider a linear consensus model in the presence of misbehaving agents whose behavior diverge from the nominal consensus evolution. Given a complex network having misbehaving agents, [11] illustrates the problem of ensuring consensus under non-colluding and Byzantine attacks. Given a class of general LTI systems, consensus under DoS attacks is analyzed for undirected [12] and directed [13] topology. The results in [12, 13] hypothesize sufficient conditions to ensure asymptotic consensus and also characterize the frequency and the duration of the DoS interval. However, the above analysis primarily relies on static graphs illustrating an idealistic setup.
Recently game-theoretic results are employed in conjunction with distributed optimization to tackle the security problems for largescale cyber-physical networks. In the game-theoretic setup, the notion of interdependent security games has recently been explored to compute optimal and strategic security investments by multiple defenders, for example see [14, 15] . In [14, 15] , the authors consider each defender is responsible for the security of multiple assets, in which the inter-dependencies among the assets are captured by an interdependency graph. The authors redesign the problem of computing the optimal defense allocation by a single defender as a convex optimization problem and establish the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium of the game between multiple defenders. Given a networked control system, [16] investigates a slightly different problem, where the authors reformulate a general-sum, two-player, mixed strategy game between an attacker and a defender. The authors of [16] exploit the nonlinear programming paradigm to analyze the dependence of a Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium on the relative budgets of the players and preserve important network nodes to attain a desirable LQR performance.
In light of the aforementioned works, in this paper we present a new appoach for mitigating DoS attacks by using ideas from sparse optimal control. Given a LTI system defined over a network of N ≥ 2 nodes, we first design a sparse linear quadratic regulator (LQR) optimal controller using l 1 -sparsity promotion techniques, proposed in [17] . The LQR control law is given as u(t) = K x(t). The nonzero blocks K i j of the sparse matrix K indicate the existence of communication links between nodes i and j, carrying state x i (t) to controller u j (t). We carry out an offline analysis to evaluate the priority of these feedback communication links in terms of how much loss is incurred in the closed-loop LQR objective function when any block K i j is removed. We assume that an attacker may also know about this priority ordering, and thereby is most likely to attack the links with highest priority so that he/she can cause maximum damage to the closed-loop response. To prevent this, we present a message rerouting strategy by which the states that are scheduled to be transmitted through the high priority links can now be quickly rerouted through lower priority ones in case the former becomes dysfunctional from a DoS attack. We present algorithms that capture various practical issues related to the size of the rerouted state vector versus the volume of the low-priority link. One must note that following the re-routing, the attacked link is not available for service, and the states of the low priority links can no longer be accommodated for communication either. Thus, retaining the same control gains for the rest of the states may result in a severely suboptimal closed-loop performance. We, therefore, finally run a structured H 2 control algorithm, proposed in [18] to determine the post-attack optimal feedback gains. We illustrate various aspects of the proposed algorithms by simulations. For more details, the readers are encouraged to visit [19] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we formulate the problem, while in Section III we document a preparatory note on the sparsity promoting optimal control problem. We present our proposed rerouting algorithm in Section IV. Finally in Section V we provide an numerical example to verify our algorithm.
Notation: We denote the set of real and natural numbers by R and N respectively. 1 is a matrix with all its entries equal to one, while I k symbolizes the identity matrix of dimension k. 0 pq denotes a zero matrix of dimension p × q. Given a matrix M ∈ R p×q , ||M|| F defines the 'Frobenius norm' of M, and M( j, :) ∈ R 1×q presents the j th row of M, with j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p}. For a square matrix N ∈ R p×p , trace(N) is calculated as trace(N) := p i=1 n ii . Given two matrices A ∈ R p×q and B ∈ R r×s , A ⊗ B ∈ R pr×qs defines their kronecker product. Similarly, for two matrices C, D ∈ R m×n , the standard hadamard product is denoted as C • D ∈ R m×n .
II. Problem Setup
Let us consider the continuous-time LTI system aṡ
where
n is the overall state vector, where x j (t) ∈ R n j is the state corresponding to node j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}
q is the disturbance, and y(t) ∈ R p is the system output. The matrices A ∈ R n×n , B ∈ R n×m and W ∈ R n×q are with appropriate dimensions. In addition, the matrices C ∈ R p×n and D ∈ R p×m are defined as C := Q 1/2 0 and D := 0 R 1/2 , where Q = Q ≥ 0 and R = R > 0 are the state and the control performance matrices. We assume, the matrix pair (A, B) is stabilizable and (A, Q 1/2 ) is detectable. We consider a state feedback control input
where K ∈ R m×n is the feedback gain matrix, and is expressed as
where the sub-matrix K i j ∈ R m i ×n j represents a communication link that delivers a block of information of state j ∈ {1, · · · , N} to control i ∈ {1, · · · , N}. For i = j, the feedback links will be referred to as local links, and as communication links otherwise.
Notice that, given a LTI system (1), an optimal gain K ∈ R m×n can be designed employing the LQR strategy [20] . When K is optimal, every block K i j and K ii are, in general, non-zero submatrices, implying that the communication network required for exchanging the states is a dense graph i.e., communication links from every state to every control input. Such dense graphs can result in high communication costs. Therefore, to reduce the cost, we impose an additional structural constraint Ω on the structure of K as follows [18] : minimize
where the cost function J(K) is defined as
The P(K) ∈ R n×n matrix stated above, denotes the closed-loop observability Gramian and presented as
which is obtained by solving the Lyapunov equation
Given a system (1) and (2), let K 1 ∈ Ω be the solution of (4), in which, a communication link K 1 i j ∈ R m i ×n j delivers a block of information of state j to control i. We assume, during the closed loop operation, an attacker attacks either a communication link or a local link of K 1 to destabilize the system. For instance, killing a communication/ local link say K * 1 i j , containing r > 0, number of messages equivalently signifies K * 1 i j is zeroed out. Let K 2 ∈ R m×n be the post-attack feedback gain in which K * 1 i j = 0 i j . Therefore, after the attack, we focus on addressing the following objective: Problem 2.1: Finding some communication space in K 2 to reroute the attacked r messages. In particular, we need to determine 'r spots' in the off-diagonal and the diagonal blocks of K 2 such that the resultant closed loop system is stable, and it minimizes the cost function J(K 2 ).
III. Technical preliminaries
In the following section, we briefly review the sparsity promoting optimal control problem. The readers are encouraged to see [17] for details.
A. Sparsity-Promoting Optimal Control Problems
The optimization problem (4) solely relies on the structure of the communication graph. Hence, in the following, we characterize the optimization setup, in which the sparsity of the feedback gain is directly subsumed into the objective function as
where, card : R m×n → N is the cardinality function i.e., the number of nonzero elements of a matrix (denoted as nnz (·)), and is defined as card (K) := N i, j=1 nnz (K i j ). In addition, β ∈ [0, ∞) is a scalar gain, and a large value of β leads to a sparser K. Since the objective function (6) is non-convex due to the cardinality function, therefore it is typically replaced by the weighted l 1 norm of the optimization variables [17] . Given a feedback gain K ∈ R m×n , the weighted l 1 norm is represented as
where G i j are the non-negative weights, and defined as G i j := 1/ ||K i j || F + ε with 0 < ε 1. Therefore, (6) can be relaxed as minimize
where, J(K) is the square of the closed loop H 2 norm and i, j G i j ||K i j || F is the sparsity promoting penalty function.
IV. Proposed Rerouting Algorithm
Given a continuous-time system (1), this section presents a rerouting algorithm to mitigate the cyber-attacks for LTI systems. Our strategy can typically be categorized in three steps : i) link prioritization ranking algorithm, ii) rerouting algorithm, and iii) structured H 2 algorithm. Remark 4.1: As indicated earlier, we consider K in (2) to be partitioned into r 1 non-zero block matrices.
Step 1: Link prioritization ranking algorithm: Given a LTI system (1) with the feedback gain K ∈ R m×n , this step evaluates the priority of the feedback communication links K i j . It typically carries out an offline analysis technique to evaluate the priority of the feedback communication links in terms of how much loss is incurred in the closed-loop LQR objective function when any block K i j is removed. We initialize a small value of β ∈ R denoted as β initial . It results a centralized LQR gain K = K c ∈ R m×n , and starts minimizing (8) . As stated earlier, the solution of (8) becomes sparser as β increases; hence we obtain different sparsity pattern of K by varying β. Therefore, from these different sparsity patterns of K, we accumulate the knowledge of the priority of each control blocks. Following this, we construct a matrix N initial : R m×n → R r 1 ×r 2 in which the control blocks are placed based on their priority. In the sequel, we denote r 1 ∈ N as the total number of non-zero control blocks present in K, while r 2 ∈ N defines the size of each block.
Algorithm 1 (Offline) link prioritization ranking algorithm 1: Input data: A, B, W, Q, R from (1), and β initial , 2: Output data: K and N initial (K), 3: Initialize
Minimize (8) and obtain the total number of nonzero control blocks in K at β j , 6: Determine the control blocks which are vanished to sparsify K at β j w.r.t β j−1 , 7: Assign the vanished control blocks in N o (·), with the priority pertaining to β j , 8 : end for
The functionality of Algorithm 1 is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Remark 4.2: The link prioritization ranking algorithm stated above, is performed offline, and it typically considers the class of problems in which the attacked communication links do not vary with time.
Step 2: Rerouting 1 algorithm: Given a continuous-time LTI system (1) and (2), Step-1 generates N initial (K) ∈ R r 1 ×r 2 accumulating all the non-zero control blocks of K ∈ R m×n and assigns priority to 1 In this work, the notion of rerouting signifies to give up some lower priority communication links to sustain an attacked one. each of them. In addition, let q : R r 1 ×r 2 → R r 1 be the priority vector, which hold the priority information of the control blocks stacked in N initial (K). We assume the attacker knows N initial (K) and q(N initial (K)) ∈ R r 1 and based on this information, it attacks communication links to destabilize the overall closed-loop system. Let p attack (·) ∈ R r 1 be the attack index, and it contains information about the attacked control blocks/ communication links, in which, the j th row denoted as p attack ( j), is defined as:
To design a countermeasure, we assume the defender knows N initial (K), q(·) and p attack (·). In the following, we present three variants of the rerouting algorithms described in Algorithm 2 − 4. Let us remark, the first rerouting algorithm given in Algorithm 2, based on the following assumption: Assumption 4.1: All the sub-matrices K i j of K, are of the same dimension. STOP. Countermeasure can not be implemented. 10 Algorithm 2 is designed based on Assumption 4.1, where we assume each control block to have the same size. In the subsequent algorithms, we relax Assumption 4.1 and consider a more generalized setup, in which, each control block is of different dimensions i.e. control nodes might have different number of states and control inputs assigned to them. Hence in the sequel, we present two variants of the rerouting algorithms described in Algorithm 3 and 4, in which Algorithm 3 presents a rerouting strategy for a single link attack, while Algorithm 4 elucidates multiple links attack.
Remark 4.3:
We recall the class of gain matrices K in which, each communication link (say K i j ) carries different amounts of information corresponding to state x i (t) from the i th node to controller u j (t) at the j th node. Under these circumstances, a single link attack describes a scenario, where the attacker attacks only one communication link, while in a multiple links attack, the attacker kills several (more than one) communication channels. However, Algorithm 4 can handle multiple links attack as well as single link attack problem. Consequently, Algorithm 3 is considered as a simpler version of Algorithm 4, and provides a much-needed foundation to design Algorithm 4.
Remark 4.4: As stated in
Step 1, given an N initial (·) ∈ R r 1 ×r 2 , r 1 denotes the total number of the non-zero control blocks present in the gain matrix K, while r 2 defines the size of each block. However, Algorithm 3 and 4 consider a K matrix, in which, each control blocks are of different dimensions. Let,r 1 ,r 2 , · · · ,r n with n ∈ N, be the sizes of the control blocks present in K, then in Algorithm 3 and 4, we select r 2 = max {r 1 ,r 2 , · · · ,r n }.
In Algorithm 3 stated in the following, r attack denotes the single link which is attacked. Calculate the number of available (not attacked) communication spaces (denoted as c 1 ∈ R) to reroute c 2 ∈ R attacked messages, 10: if (c 1 < c 2 ) then Set k = 0, 14: while (c 2 > 0) do 15: Update k = k + 1 and reroute c 2 information via low priority control channel N(k, :) = 0 1 r 2 , 16: Update c 2 = c 2 − s(k), for ( j = 1 , · · · , r 3 ) do 
Set c 2 = s(a1( j)) and c 1 = 0, 20: Go to Step 8 − 19 of Algorithm 3, 21: end for 22: end if 23: Return N final (K) = N(·).
Step 3: Structured H 2 algorithm: The structured H 2 algorithm collects the post-attack N final (K) ∈ R r 1 ×r 2 from Step-2. N final (K) contains the information corresponding to the zero and non-zero control blocks, and allows us to construct the post-attack structural constraint Ω (sayΩ). Then our objective boils down to solving the following optimization problem:
where I
ĉ Ω = 1 − IΩ, and IΩ is the structural identity of the subspacê Ω with its i j th entry as
The augmented Lagrangian for (9) is evaluated as
in which
F is introduced to locally convexify the Lagrangian. (see [18] , [21] for the details). In (10), the penalty weight γ is a positive scalar, while Λ ∈ R m×n is the Lagrange multiplier. For fixed Λ i , minimize (10) with respect to unstructured K 4:
Update γ i+1 = α γ i with α > 1 6: until: the stopping criteria
The optimization problem given in (9), always yields a postattack stabilizing control gain K; see [17, Remark 3] for details.
Remark 4.5: Let us remark that Step 1 of our proposed algorithm is mainly carried out offline, while Step 2 and 3 are performed online after an attack occurs in the network.
Step 1 can be executed at any time before the attack, and it doesn't depend on the characteristics of the attack model.
V. Simulation Results
In this section, we present a numeric example to illustrate our proposed algorithm. We revisit a coupled dynamical system with N = 10 nodes, aṡ (11) where, x i (t) ∈ R 2 is the state vector of the i th sub-system, while d i (t) ∈ R 2 , and u i (t) ∈ R are the corresponding disturbance and the control input. The overall system dynamics evolves aṡ
where the drift matrix A ∈ R 20×20 is structured as
We consider A to be a random matrix, in which, all the eigenvalues lie in the open left half of the complex plane, while the dominant eigenvalue is placed relatively close to the origin. In addition, we calculate the overall B ∈ R 20×10 and W ∈ R 20×20 given in (12), as
We select the design parameters as Q = I 20 and R = 10 I 10 respectively. Given the system dynamics (12), we consider the control law u(t) = K x(t), where K ∈ R 10×20 is the feedback gain matrix. The gain matrix K is designed based on the sparsity promoting algorithm (8) . First, we start minimizing (8) for a small initial value of β. We consider the block sparsity structure with the weighted sum of the Frobenius norm given in (7), as the sparsitypromoting penalty function and set G i j = 1/ ||K i j || F + ε with ε = 10 −3 . As stated earlier, the small (initial) value of β yields a centralized LQR gain K c ∈ R 10×20 , depicted in Fig. 2 (a) . Then, we perform an offline analysis based on Algorithm 1 to collect all the non-zero control blocks of K ∈ R 10×20 and prioritize each of them. We do the prioritization in terms of the loss of closed-loop performance when the corresponding block of the feedback gain matrix is removed. We assume, that the attacker has the knowledge of the priority of each control blocks of K and attacks a set of communication links (denoted in red in Fig. 2 (a) ) which results in a poor closed loop response. Finally, an application of the re-routing algorithms evaluates the post-attack sparsity structure illustrated in Fig. 2 (b) .
Notice that initially the centralized LQR gain K = K c has 50 control blocks, where each control block carries 4 unit of information (placed inside the rectangle shown in Fig. 2 (a), (b) ). The attacker attacks 22 control blocks (denoted in red in Fig 2 (a) ) Next, we simulate another numerical setup illustrated in Fig. 3 (a), (b) . We assume the centralized LQR gain K c ∈ R 10×20 partitioned into 100 control blocks in which each control block contains 2 unit of information. Notice that, the attacker attacks 48 control blocks (denoted in red in Fig. 3 (a) ). Then, by exploiting the rerouting algorithm the attacked information are safely rerouted via remaining unaffected (Lower priority) 52 control blocks; see Fig. 3 (b) .
In Table I , we present a comparative study of the J(K) values corresponding to both the simulations stated above.
Remark 5.1: Notice that, the figures presented above in particular, Fig. 2 (b), 3 (b) , illustrate the post-attack structural constraint, in which, we employ the structured H 2 algorithm given in Algorithm 5, to evaluate the post-attack feedback gains and its corresponding J(K) values. The post-attack (after rerouting) J(K) values are documented in Table I , however, we exclude the post-attack feedback gain matrices due to the space limitation. Table I , it seems that not a lot of control performance is lost when the DoS attack is happening, and also not a lot of performance is gained when the proposed countermeasure is applied to the attacked systems. This has occurred due to the choice of the system matrix A given in Eq. (12) . Depending on the given A, B, W stated in (1), the difference between the pre-attack J(K) and the post-attack J(K) can vary. 
Remark 5.2: In

VI. Concluding remarks
This work presents a new algorithm to alleviate cyber-attacks for LTI systems. We assume the anonymous attacker has the information corresponding to the structured feedback gain matrix and the priority of its control channels. Then based on the attack model, we develop a rerouting strategy, in which, after an attack, the higher priority communication data are rerouted through lower priority control channels. The priority of the control channels are assigned employing sparse optimization methods with sparsity promoting penalty functions. The rerouting functions allow us to determine the post-attack structural constraint, in which an application of the structured H 2 algorithm evaluates the post-attack feedback gain. Future work involves analyzing the complexity of the proposed algorithms.
